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AIDS AND PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE:
A CRISIS OF RISK SHARING
Robert A Padgug,t Gerald M. Oppenheimer t
and Jon Eisenhandlertm
INTRODUCTION
The American health care financing system is in crisis; it
requires total reconstruction, or at least major alterations. The
AIDS epidemic has compounded this crisis by magnifying all of
the faults of the health care financing system. Ironically, these
very faults have rendered attempts to provide care for persons
with HIV and AIDS far more difficult than they might
otherwise have been.
The weak and increasingly inadequate risk-sharing
arrangements at the heart of employer-sponsored private health
insurance are an important link between the crises of AIDS and
the health care financing system. These arrangements not only
fail to facilitate the wide sharing of health care costs - and,
therefore, broad access to health care itself - but act directly to
exclude from insurance coverage those with the greatest medical
needs, among them persons with HIV and AIDS.
This Article explores the nature of American risk-sharing
arrangements and the problems generated by them, as
exemplified by the dual crisis of health financing and AIDS. It
then discusses more satisfactory risk-sharing arrangements
which could serve as the basis of a reformed health care
financing system. These arrangements illustrate the principles
upon which workable health care reforms must be based.
Finally, the Article uses the health care reform principles as the
foundation for a critique of the major health care reform
proposals now before our nation.
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I. THE INTERSECTION OF THE AIDS EPIDEMIC
AND THE CRISIS OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING
The AIDS epidemic came to public notice in the early 1980s,
at a time when America's health care insurers found themselves
in a crisis of constantly increasing health care costs.
Commercial insurers, as well as the public, were persuaded by
early cost estimates which inaccurately calculated the costs of
treating AIDS and firmly established AIDS as a disease with
unacceptably high costs.'
When AIDS met an already-strained health insurance
system, commercial insurers declared that they had to protect
themselves from what they perceived as a risk of financial ruin
from HIV and AIDS.2 Years of narrowing their risk pools
weakened insurers' ability to absorb AIDS treatment costs.
Consequently, insurers took aggressive steps to stave off further
financial difficulties by attempting to exclude victims of the new
epidemic from their risk pools. Since that time, persons with
AIDS have faced a constant threat of exclusion from health
insurance and, accordingly, a constant threat of exclusion from
health care itself.3
'See Jesse Green et al., The $147,000 Misunderstanding: Overstating
the Costs of AIDS, 19 J. HEALTH POL., POLY & L. (forthcoming Spring 1994)
[hereinafter The $147,000 Misunderstanding] (giving an account of the
inaccuracies of one highly influential 1986 AIDS cost study). For more
accurate estimates of the costs of AIDS, see Jon Eisenhandler, AIDS: Update
and Reserving, 18 REC. Soc'Y ACTUARIES 673, 673-93 (1993); Daniel M. Fox &
Emily H. Thomas, The Cost of AIDS: Exaggeration, Entitlement, and
Economics, in AIDS AND THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 197-210 (Larry 0. Gostin
ed., 1990); Fred J. Hellinger, The Lifetime Cost of Treating a Person with HIV,
270 JAMA 474, 474-78 (1993); discussion infra part II.
2 For early articles on AIDS and insurance, see AIDS:ONE: LEGAL,
SOcIAL & ETHICAL ISSUES FACING THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY (James Vculek
ed., 1988) [hereinafter AIDS:ONE]; see also Norman Daniels, Insurability and
the HIV Epidemic: Ethical Issues in Underwriting, 68 MILBANK Q. 497 (1990)
(rejecting the argument that actuarial determinations of insurability are the
only just means of distributing health care); Gerald M. Oppenheimer & Robert
A. Padgug, AIDS: The Risks to Insurers, the Threat to Equity, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Oct. 1986, at 18 (proposing state-sponsored solutions to the
problems of insuring persons with AIDS through private health insurance).
' For works documenting the personal and societal effects of the
exclusion of persons with AIDS from private insurance, including the loss of
all coverage or the necessity of relying on Medicaid, see Daniel Fife & James
McAnaney, Private Medical Insurance Among Philadelphia Residents
Diagnosed with AIDS, 6 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES 512,
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Many self-insured employers, fearing the financial
consequences of insuring persons with AIDS, have also taken
actions to remove them from their health insurance plans.
These actions include administering HIV antibody tests and
setting exceptionally low per-occurrence, lifetime, or yearly caps
on - or even the complete elimination of - reimbursement for
AIDS.4 Attempts to exclude persons with HIV infection have
generally been successful, in spite of the efforts of some states
to prevent them.5 These discriminatory practices have been
upheld by a number of courts, including the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, on the ground that the federal legislation regulating
self-insurance plans6 does not forbid them and, in fact, preempts
state legislation prohibiting discrimination of this sort.'
515-517 (1993); Jesse Green & Peter S. Arno, The 'Medicaidization' of AIDS:
Trends in the Financing of HIV-Related Medical Care, 264 JAMA 1261, 1261
(1990) [hereinafter The "Medicaidization' of A!DS]; Nancy E. Kass et al., Loss
of Private Health Insurance Among Homosexual Men with AIDS, 28 INQUIRY
249, 253-54 (1991); Donna Minkowitz, Redlining the Arts, Insurers Brand
Artists AIDS-Prone, VLAGE VOICE, Aug. 22, 1989, at 19; cf John A.
Fleishman & Vincent Mor, Insurance Status Among People with AIDS:
Relationships with Sociodemographic Characteristics and Service Use, 30
INQUIRY 180, 187 (1993) (explaining that while there is a large increase in the
number of people with AIDS covered by Medicaid in states with generous
eligibility criteria, other states with more restrictive eligibility criteria are
experiencing smaller increases).
" See Health Ins. Ass'n of Am., State Financing for AIDS: Options and
Trends, 3 INTERGOVERNMENTAL AIDS REP. 1, 1-8, 12 (1990) (describing the
exclusion of persons with HIV/AIDS from insurance coverage). Of the
insurers responding to this 1987 survey taken by the HIA, 100% considered
applicants with AIDS uninsurable, 99% considered applicants with less
advanced stages of the illness uninsurable, and 91% considered asymptematic
persons affected with HIV uninsurable. Id.; see also OFF. OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, MEDICAL TESTING AND HEALTH INSURANCE 80
(1988) (finding that most insurers had already begun or planned to screen
individual and group applicants for lIV infection, and that 77% of commercial
and Blue Cross/Blue Shield carriers who insured small groups and more than
50% of those who covered large groups either already screened for HIV
infection or would soon do so). See generally sources cited supra note 3
(documenting some of the results of the exclusion of persons with HIV
infection or AIDS from coverage).
5 See Donald H.J. Hermann, AIDS and the Law, in AIDS AND ETHICS
277, 291 (Frederic G. Reamer ed., 1991).
6 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (Supp. IV 1992).
7 McGann v. H&H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied
sub nom. Greenberg v. H&H Music Co., 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992). See generally
1993]
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Moreover, employers have increasingly resorted to self-financing
of employee health benefits so as to take advantage of ERISA's
protection of their treatment of persons with AIDS or HIV
infection.' Whether the recent implementation of the Americans
with Disability Act9 ("ADA") will alter this situation remains
uncertain at the present time.'0
Mark H. Jackson, Health Insurance: The Battle over Limits on Coverage, in
AIDS AGENDA: EMERGING IssuEs IN CIVIL RIGHTs 147 (Nan D. Hunter &
William B. Rubenstein eds., 1992) (examining insurance practices that limit
coverage for HIV but not for other diseases, focusing on available legal
remedies and gaps in the law that permit those practices to continue). For
further discussion of the implications of AIDS caps and the problem of ERISA,
see generally Mark Scherzer, After McGann: Policy Implications of the
Decision Authorizing Discriminatory Benefit Caps for Treatment of AIDS, 7
AIDS & PUB. POL'Y J. 96 (1992); Edward F. Shay, Discrimination in Health
Benefits: ERISA and Beyond, 7 AIDS & PUB. POL'Y J. 92 (1992); Ronald
Turner, ERISA and Employer Capping of Medical Benefits for Treatment of
AIDS and Related Illnesses, 7 AIDS & PUB. POL'Y J. 89 (1992); Steve
Taravella, Self-Insured Employers Limit AIDS Benefits, MODERN HEALTHCARE,
Feb. 19, 1990, at 52.
'See generally Steven DiCarlo & Jon R. Gabel, Conventional Health
Insurance: A Decade Later, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Spring 1989, at
77, 81 (noting the rise of self-administered health care plans among employ-
ers); Gail A. Jensen & Jon R. Gabel, The Erosion of Purchased Health
Insurance, 25 INQUIRY 328, 328-30 (1988) (examining reasons for the rapid
growth of self-insurance); Dale A. Rublee, Self-Funded Health Benefit Plans,
255 JAMA 787 (1986) (providing a history of self-funding); Eric Zicklin, More
Employers Self-Insure Their Medical Plans, Survey Finds, BUS. & HEALTH,
Apr. 1992, at 74-75 (summarizing survey of health care benefits revealing
clear trend toward self-funding).
9 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. III 1991).
'0 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has issued
regulations for the ADA which would appear to make caps on AIDS reim-
bursement difficult to defend. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1993). Several cases
involving health insurance plans that have eliminated or limited coverage for
AIDS patients have recently been filed with the EEOC. Milt Friedman,
Patients Cite Bias in AIDS Coverage by Health Plans, N.Y. TIMEs, June 1,
1993, at Al, D2. In Donaghey v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council Trust Fund,
EEOC Charge No. 160-93-0419 (Jan. 28, 1993), the hearing officer ruled that
Mason Tender's exclusion of coverage for HW and AIDS was discriminatory
and therefore in violation of the ADA. Federal courts are now entering this
arena. The EEOC filed suit in the United States District Court in the
Southern District of New York on June 10, 1993, to enforce the Donaghey
ruling. Colleen Mulcahy, ADA Law Could Smash Health Plan Caps on AIDS,
NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Apr. 19, 1993 at 23, 33; Mary E. Pfium, EEOC Seeks to
Compel Plan to Cover AIDS, Bus. INS., June 14, 1993, at 20. For general
overviews of the potential impact of the ADA on employer-sponsored health
insurance, see Joseph A. Brislin, The Effect of the Americans with Disabilities
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Attempts to exclude persons with HIV infection from
insurance coverage have thus become common and, to a large
degree, successful. Many persons with AIDS are forced to rely
upon Medicaid, which has many shortcomings as a catastrophic
health coverage program, including low reimbursement levels,
inconsistent coverage policies, inconsistent and cumbersome
eligibility requirements, and the refusal of many providers to
care for those covered by the program." Additionally, many
persons with AIDS who lack adequate coverage belong to
socially marginal groups (including the poor, intravenous drug
users, and gay men) who have traditionally been underserved
by the health care system. 2
With time we have come to realize that reports of the
health insurance industry's impending death were greatly
exaggerated. 1" However, we are only beginning to appreciate
Act upon Medical Insurance and Employee Benefits, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS J.,
Mar. 1992, at 9, 9-13; Paul M. Heylman et al., Employee Benefits and ADA:
Nondiscrimination or Mandated Benefits?, BENEFITS Q., Fourth Quarter 1992,
at 50. In addition to the ADA, various bills have been introduced into
Congress that would specifically prohibit the kind of discrimination repre-
sented by caps on AIDS reimbursement. See, e.g., S. 765, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993) (California Senator Boxer's Health Insurance Protection Act);
H.R. 975, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (The Group Health Plan Nondiscrimi-
nation Act of 1993).
" For problems with Medicaid coverage, reimbursement, and eligibility
requirements, see JOHN F. HOLAHAN & JOEL W. COHEN, MEDICAfD: THE
TRADE-OFF BETWEEN COsT CONTAINMENT AND AccEss TO CARE 99-110 (1986);
MICHAEL T. ISBELL, HEALTH CARE REFORM: LESSONS FROM THE HIV EPIEMIC
103-07, 111-18, 125-29 (1993); The "Medicaidization' of AIDS, supra note 3, at
1263-65; cf. Henry Grabowski, Medicaid Patients' Access to New Drugs,
HEALTH AFF., Winter 1988, at 102-114 (discussing the negative impact of state
formularies on the availablity of new drugs to Medicaid recipients).
' For the effect of exclusion from insurance on particular groups of
persons with AIDS, see supra note 3. Generally, access to health care is
correlated with socioeconomic class and other demographic characteristics.
See, e.g., Nancy Adler et al., Socioeconomic Inequalities in Health: No Easy
Solution, 269 JAMA 3140 (1993); Marcia Angell, Privilege and Health - What
Is the Connection?, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 126 (1993); Paula Braveman et al.,
Women Without Health Insurance: Links Between Access, Poverty, Ethnicity,
and Health, 149 W. J. MED. 708 (1988); Karyn Davis, Inequality and Access to
Health Care, 69 MILBANK Q. 253 (1991); Jonathan S. Feinstein, The
Relationship Between Socioeconomic Status and Health: A Review of the
Literature, 71 MILBANK Q. 279 (1993); Gregory Pappas et. al., The Increasing
Disparity in Mortality Between Socioeconomic Groups in the United States,
1960 and 1986, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 103 (1993).
" Although the cost of AIDS remains relatively high, early estimates
have proven to be inaccurately high. See Fox & Thomas, supra note 1, at 198;
1993]
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that while AIDS represents only a minor threat to insurance,
the insurance system represents a mortal threat to persons with
AIDS.1' Without health insurance, persons with AIDS are ill-
equipped to fight their long and sometimes expensive battle
with the formidable disease. The next part deals specifically
with why our present health care financing system has failed.
II. SHATTERING THE MYTH OF THE
UNMANAGEABLE COSTS OF AIDS TREATMENT:
EMPIRE BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD
As noted, both the public and insurance professionals have
been convinced from the outset of the epidemic that the costs of
AIDS treatment are too high to be managed effectively by the
insurance industry. Given such a misconception, some have
concluded that the system's failure to meet the health insurance
needs of persons with AIDS is the result of the nature of the
need itself, rather than the result of shortcomings of the
insurance system. The experience of at least one community-
oriented insurer, Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield, however,
demonstrates that the costs of treating AIDS are not necessarily
unmanageable. The true cause of the failure to provide
adequate health care insurance to persons with AIDS is, in
reality, the structure of our health care financing system.
Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield ("Empire") is a private,
not-for-profit insurance company located in the epicenter of the
AIDS epidemic.15 Empire provides health coverage to almost
eight million persons in the eastern portion of New York State.
As one might expect, given its size, location, and underwriting
policies, Empire has covered a very large number of persons
The $147,000 Misunderstanding, supra note 1; Hellinger, supra note 1, at 474-
78; see also Eisenhandler, supra note 1, at 675 (explaining the reasons for the
increase in MIV-related medical costs); discussion infra part III.
'
4 Cf Gerald M. Oppenheimer & Robert A. Padgug, AIDS and the Crisis
of Health Insurance, in AIDS AND ETHICS 105, 106 (Frederic G. Reamer ed.,
1991) [hereinafter AIDS and the Crisis] (claiming that among the millions
being excluded from health care coverage are persons with the greatest
needs).
"5 All Empire data cited in the following pages, as well as additional data
and analysis, are available in periodically-updated form from Jon
Eisenhandler at Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 622 Third Avenue, New
York, NY 10017. The entire section on Empire is based on long-standing
personal acquaintance with the company on the part of two of the authors,
Eisenhandler and Padgug, who are employed there.
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with AIDS and other HIV-related conditions (Table 1). The
company has identified almost 19,000 cases of full-blown AIDS
among its subscribers through the end of 1992.
TABLE 1
Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield
AIDS Cases
Cohort Cases
1982 96
1983 309
1984 577
1985 943
1986 1,357
1987 1,838
1988 2,923
1989 2,848
1990 2,918
1991 2,963
1992* 2,041
Total 18,814
"Incomplete data
For research purposes, persons with AIDS covered by
Empire have been divided into cohorts; they have been grouped
by the year in which they were identified in the company's
claims system as having been diagnosed with AIDS. By
grouping cases into cohorts, Empire can monitor trends in cost
and utilization associated with AIDS. Based on these trends,
Empire can then make projections of the lifetime treatment
costs of different cohorts.
All services incurred beginning three years prior to
diagnosis or identification and all services incurred after
diagnosis or identification until death (or the cessation of
coverage) are considered to be HIV-related. Data beginning
three years prior to an AIDS diagnosis or identification are
included in order to incorporate the medical care and costs of
treating the early HIV-symptomatic stage, in which substantial
increases in hospital utilization and other services tend to begin.
The average payments per person with AIDS for Empire
customers with both hospital and major medical coverage are
substantial, and are projected to reach about $190,000 for the
cohort of 1993 (Table 2). The projections include estimates for
future health care inflation, increasing life expectancies for
persons with AIDS, and new and more costly treatment
1993]
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modalities. The total cost of treatment is, of course, higher than
the payments made by Empire, since the data in Table 2 does
not include costs of treatment borne by the patient for
uncovered services, deductibles and coinsurance, or provider
balance billing beyond plan payment allowances.
TABLE 2
Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield
Projected Lifetime Insurance Payments by Cohort!
Cohort Cases
1986 $52,000
1987 $65,000
1988 $82,000
1989 $100,000
1990 $115,000
1991 $140,000
1992 $175,000
1993 $190,000
* Paid data, net of patient cost-sharing for patients with both
hospital and major medical coverage; includes hospital, physician,
home care, and pharmaceutical costs.
While the data clearly demonstrates that lifetime treatment
costs of persons with AIDS are substantial, they are not unlike
treatment costs incurred by persons with other serious diseases
typically covered by health insurance policies. For example,
lifetime treatment costs for a person diagnosed with AIDS in
1991 are about the same as the costs associated with an episode
of care for a bone marrow transplant in the same year - about
$150,000. The average lifetime costs of a person with AIDS
somewhat less than those for a person receiving a kidney
transplant ($90,000 per transplant in 1991, with total lifetime
costs two to three times higher).
It is important to note, however, that individual cases of
AIDS diverge considerably from the mean. Some are relatively
inexpensive and others cost from two to three times as much as
the average. In addition, the actual incidence of AIDS in
particular populations varies widely and is essentially
unpredictable for all but the very largest employer groups,
whose risk is spread among a large population.
Finally, costs associated with AIDS treatment during the
first twelve years of the epidemic have reached almost $900
million dollars (Table 3). Yet AIDS accounts for little more than
2 percent of Empire's total expenditure for all illnesses during
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that same period. In the most recent years, that figure has not
exceeded 3 to 3 percent and is not expected to increase.
TABLE 3
Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield
Total AIDS Payments by Year ($ thousands)
Cohort Cases Medical* Total
1982 $3.1 n/a n/a
1983 9.7 n/a n/a
1984 17.9 $1.3 $19.2
1985 31.3 2.3 33.6
1986 47.6 3.5 51.1
1987 61.7 6.3 68.0
1988 92.0 10.5 102.5
1989 118.1 15.3 133.4
1990 134.3 20.2 154.5
1991" 151.2 25.6 176.8
1992" 104.8 23.1 127.9
Total $771.5 $108.1 $879.6
Incomplete data. Each year is projected to reach about $185
million.
" A majority of customers with AIDS only have hospital coverage
through Empire, which accounts for the great discrepancy between
the total corporate expenditures for hospital and for medical care.
This brief analysis suggests not only that the costs of AIDS
are relatively manageable in- absolute terms, but also that for
various reasons, a third-party payer can, given appropriate
underwriting policies, successfully deal with the costs of treating
the disease. The problems commercial insurers and some self-
insured employers are having with managing AIDS treatment
costs are products of their own underwriting policies.
III. THE FRAGMENTATION OF RISK POOLS IN
THE UNITED STATES
Clearly, the problem is not that AIDS treatment costs are
too high, but that the majority of the insurance industry and
large self-insuring employers are unable to manage the costs of
AIDS through their risk-spreading mechanisms. The insurance
industry has weakened its own ability to share risk broadly. In
order to see how this has occurred, it is helpful to understand
the historical development of the mechanism that is at the heart
of health insurance: risk pooling. Health insurers attempt to
1993]
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spread the losses of the few who use significant amounts of
health care among a larger pool of persons, most of whom
require relatively little or no care in any given year. 6
The actual methods of spreading risk and the specific
makeup of the pools within which risk is spread have varied
considerably over the decades. There is, and always has been,
much controversy over the policy choices made in determining
just how risk will be spread, notwithstanding the insistence of
actuaries and underwriters in the employ of insurance
companies that their current methods are firmly anchored in
science and reason. A bit of history at this point will be
instructive.
17
In the 1930s, when the Blue Cross companies created the
policies which served as the prototypes for our current health
insurance system, insurance premiums were based on what is
known as community rating. In this community rating system,
the costs of health care were spread among the entire
population covered by a particular type of policy, and premiums
were set at the same level for everyone in the community.'"
This system represented a broad spreading of the risks, and
thus of the costs, of health care utilization over a relatively
large population.
6 On the general nature of health insurance as protection against, and
the sharing of, risk, see STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON AGING, HOUSE COMM. ON
EDUCATION AND LABOR, AND HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGYAND COMMERCE, 100TH
CONG., 2ND SESS., INSURING THE UNINSURED: OPTIONS AND ANALYSIS 12-26
(Comm. Print 1988) [hereinafter INSURING THE UNINSURED].
17 For general histories of health insurance and underwriting methodolo-
gies in the United States, see INSURING THE UNINSURED, supra note 16, at 29;
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, EMPLOYMENT AND HEALTH BENEFITS: A CONNECTION
AT RISK 49-86 (Marilyn J. Field & Harold J. Shapiro eds., 1993) [hereinafter
CONNECTION AT RISK]; Ronald L. Numbers, The Third Party: Health
Insurance in America, in SICKNESS AND HEALTH IN AMERICA: READINGS IN THE
HISTORY OF MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 233, 233 (Judith W. Leavitt &
Ronald L. Numbers eds., 1985).
" For more on community rating and the early underwriting and rating
principles utilized by Blue Cross, see Robert A. Padgug, Looking Backward:
Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield as an Object of Historical Analysis, 16 J.
HEALTH POL., POLY & L. 793, 798 (1991) [hereinafter Looking Backward]; J.T.
RICHARDSON, THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF GROUP HOSPITALIZATION IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1890-1940, at 14 (1945); Thomas A. Fitzpatrick, Types of
Health Risk Bearers: Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans, in GROUP INS.
HANDBOOK 244, 254 (Robert D. Eilers & Robert M. Crowe eds., 1965).
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As a result of the shift to an employment-centered health
insurance system,19 experience rating substantially replaced
community rating.20  Employers began to provide their
employees with health insurance during the 1940s and 1950s,
and insisted, in the interest of minimizing costs, that their
premiums be based only on the actual health care utilization of
their individual employee groups. These employee groups were
normally comprised of younger and healthier persons than the
population in general. Commercial insurers, anxious to be more
competitive, complied willingly; eventually most Blue Cross and
Blue Shield plans were forced to follow suit in order to survive.
Insurance risks were thus spread among a relatively small base,
with the elderly, the unemployed, the chronically ill, and the
poor largely excluded from the system. Even small groups and
individual purchasers of insurance, who continued to be lumped
together in somewhat larger pools, felt the effects of this
development, as adjustments were made to their premiums
based on factors closely correlated with health care utilization,
such as age, sex, industry, and geographical location.
By the 1970s, in order to reduce costs further and to escape
from state legislation and regulation, large employers instituted
what is called self-funding or self-insurance, paying the health
care costs of their employees directly from their own funds and
relegating the insurance companies to the limited task of
performing certain administrative functions.2" The effect of this
trend is that the risks of health care, which even in the days of
'1 On the centrality of employers to our system of health insurance
financing and provision and how their role evolved, see CONNECTION AT RISK,
supra note 17, at 27; PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE 294 (1982).
2 0 See DUNCAN R. MACNYRE, VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURANCE AND RATE
MAKING 219-47 (1962); ROSEMARY STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH 260-
62 (1989); RAY E. TRUSSELL, PREPAYMENT FOR HOSPITAL CARE IN NEw YORK
STATE: A REPORT ON THE EIGHT BLUE CROSS PLANS SERVING NEW YORK
REsIDENTS 92-107 (1960).
2 1A current and rapid trend has been for smaller sized companies to
"self-fund" as well. See generally DiCarlo & Gabel, supra note 8, at 81-88
(discussing the incentives to self-fund and comparing health plan characteris-
tics by size of employer); Jensen & Gabel, supra note 8, at 328-43 (tracing the
decline of purchased health insurance and examining the reasons for the rapid
growth of self-insurance); Rublee, supra note 8 (providing the history of self-
funding and the percentage and numbers of groups that self-fund); Zicklin,
supra note 8, at 74-75 (summarizing survey of health care benefits revealing
clear trend toward self-funding).
1993]
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experience rating were at least shared between employer and
insurer, are now spread even more narrowly. Today, a self-
insured employer with any significant number of sick persons
will be in danger of undesirable cost increases at best and fiscal
insolvency at worst. An employer may, of course, deal with
some of the risk by "reinsuring" itself with a reinsurance
company, which will reimburse the company for health care
costs above specified amounts. The efficacy of reinsurance is,
however, reduced by its additional cost and by limits on its
availability.
22
The system thus constructed entered a period of serious
crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, it has
been confronted with substantial and continuing increases in
the costs of health care.23 These increases have threatened the
system's stability, built as it is on the narrowest of risk-sharing
bases. The crisis of escalating costs has led insurers to tighten
their underwriting rules even further in an effort to exclude
those persons who pose the greatest risk of using health
services. Among the hardest hit have been small groups and
individuals, for whom obtaining health insurance has become
extremely difficult and expensive."
22 See sources cited supra note 19 (illustrating the use of reinsurance by
self-insured employer-sponsored plans).
' See also Daniel R. Waldo et al., Health Spending Through 2030: Three
Scenarios, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1991, at 231 (projecting health cost trends
into the near and distant future). See generally CONGRESS OF THE U.S., CONG.
BUDGET OFF., EcONOMIc IMPLICATIONS OF RISING HEALTH CARE COSTS:
CAUSES, IMPLICATIONS, AND STRATEGIES (Apr. 1991); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF.,
U.S. HEALTH CARE SPENDING: TRENDS, CONTRIBUTING FACTORS, AND
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (1991) (Report to the Chairman, House Comm. on
Ways and Means).
' On the increasing exclusion from health insurance of certain individu-
als and occupational groups and the resulting difficulties to small business,
see U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: PROBLEMS CAUSED BY
A SEGMENTED MARKET 10-11 (1991); U.S. GEN. ACT. OFF., WORKERS AT RISK:
INCREASED NUMBERS OF WORKERS IN CONTINGENT EMPLOYMENT LACK
INSURANCE, OTHER BENEFITS (1991); Roger A. Formisano et al., Barriers to
Group Health Insurance Faced by Small Employers: A Case Study, BENEFITS
Q., First Quarter, 1991, at 6, 11-13; Milt Freudenheim, Health Insurers to
Reduce Losses, Blacklist Dozens of Occupations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1990, at
Al, D5; Julie Kosterlitz, Sick About Health, 5 NAT'L J. 270, 272 (1990). See
generally Richard Kronick, Health Insurance 1979-1989: The Frayed
Connection Between Employment and Insurance, 28 INQUIRY 318, 323 (1991)
(asserting stricter underwriting standards as one of several possible explana-
tions for decreased insurance coverage of low-income employees).
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Thus the private employment-based insurance system had
by the 1980s, reached a serious impasse which left a significant
proportion of the population uninsured or underinsured.'
Unfortunately, this problem developed at a time when
government, both at the state and federal levels, was also
retrenching, and the entitlement programs implemented during
the 1960s to cover those left out of the employment-centered
system were ill-prepared to extend their protection to those who
were forced out of the private insurance system.26
Today there is little doubt that both commercial insurers
and self-insured employers are structurally incapable of
spreading the costs of AIDS treatment widely enough to render
them more manageable - the risk pools they have established
are simply too narrow and fragile. It would be foolish, however,
to assume that these serious problems can be overcome by a
mere change of heart on the part of either insurers or
employers, because the problems that must be overcome are not
the result of simple ill will, but are, rather, built into the very
nature of the American health care financing system.
IV. PRINCIPLES AND VALUES UNDERLYING AMERICA'S
HEALTH CARE FINANCE SYSTEM
The health care insurance system did not develop its
present structure by chance. Instead, the structure of the
system is a direct result of the way Americans view the very
nature of health care itself.
Most modern industrialized societies view health care as a
social need, a basic right, and a byproduct of citizenship. Their
' On trends in the numbers of the uninsured, see Employee Benefit
Research Inst., Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the
Uninsured, Analysis of the March 1992 Current Population Survey, 1993 EBRI
SPECIAL REPORT AND ISSUE BRIEF No. 123; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-
MENT, U.S. CONGRESS, DOES HEALTH INSURANCE MAKE A
DIFFERENCE - BACKGROUND PAPER (1992); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE: A PROFILE OF THE UNINSURED IN SELECTED STATES
(1991); Thomas Bodenheimer, Underinsurance in America, 327 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 274, 274-78 (1992); Howard E. Freeman et al., Uninsured Working-Age
Adults: Characteristics and Consequences, 24 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 811, 813
(1990); Peter Ries, Characteristics of Persons With and Without Health Care
Coverage: United States, 1989, ADVANCE DATA FROM VITAL AND HEALTH STAT.
OF THE NAT'L CENTER FOR HEALTH STAT., June 19, 1991, at 1, 1-6.
26 See Fox & Thomas, supra note 1, at 199; HOLAHAN & COHEN, supra
note 11, at 9-13.
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health care systems are founded on the principle of "social
solidarity."2  Their governments accept the idea that
government ought to provide health care to their citizens and
believe that all citizens ought to share the costs of providing it,
just as they would with any other general social need, such as
education. Health care is treated as one of those welfare goods
which the government must guarantee to all, and which all
must bear an equitable share in financing.'
In the United States health care is a commodity distributed
in the private market. This view of health care makes the
American system distinct from health care systems abroad in a
number of ways. First, providing health insurance is left up to
the private market. In such a system, only those who have the
ability to pay for it will be able to enjoy its benefits.29 Second,
the American health care financing system is not universal; it
excludes millions of persons from coverage, many of those with
the greatest health needs among them. 0 Third, access to health
coverage depends mainly on one's employment relationship; in
1990, 64 percent of all Americans under age sixty-five held
employer-purchased health insurance."' Finally, the U.S. health
2 On the concept of social solidarity, see generally WILLIAM A- GLASER,
HEALTH INSURANCE IN PRACTICE: INTERNATIONAL VARIATIONS IN FINANCING,
BENEFITS, AND PROBLEMS (1991) (describing the health care financing systems
of key European nations with largely private insurance systems as well as the
lessons those systems bear for the reform of the American health care
financing system).
2 On the concept of health care as a right in most industrialized nations,
see generally ODIN W. ANDERSON, THE HEALTH SERVICES CONTINUUM IN
DEMOCRATIC STATES: AN INQUIRY INTO SOLVABLE PROBLEMS (1989) (on the
relationship between a nation's medical delivery system and its cultural
values); WILLIAM A. GLASER, HEALTH INSURANCE IN PRACTICE: INTERNATIONAL
VARIATIONS IN FINANCING, BENEFITS, AND PROBLEMS (1991) (describing how
other industrialized nations have transformed voluntary and private health
insurance systems into publicly-funded programs that protect their entire
populations); MILTON ROEMER, NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD
(1991) (for a survey and analysis of health care systems in industrialized and
developing nations); VICTOR W. SIDEL & RUTH SIDEL, A HEALTHY STATE (2d ed.
1983) (describing universal, publicly-funded health care systems abroad);
Bradford L. Kirkman-Lift, Health Insurance Values and Implementation in the
Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany: An Alternative Path to
Universal Coverage, 265 JAMA 2496, 2496-2502 (1991).
' Marcia Angell, How Much Will Health Care Reform Cost?, 328 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1778, 1778 (1993).
" AIDS and the Crisis, supra note 14, at 108.
31 CONNECTION AT RISK, supra note 17, at 28.
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care system is not in any real sense democratic: decisions are
not made by the population as a whole either directly or
through elected representatives, but by employers, insurers, and
bureaucrats - groups whose interests do not necessarily
coincide with those of society as a whole.
The present health care financing system possesses features
which virtually force participants to act in particular ways.
Rather than operating according to socially-determined rules to
which all must conform for the common good, each party within
the system acts to avoid costs that can be passed to others.
Avoiding treatment costs involves not only avoiding risk-
taking, but shunning wide risk-sharing as well. Insurers are
pressured to divide risk pools as finely as possible, distributing
risk among pools with similar members rather than sharing risk
among pools with a more diverse membership. Insurers claim
that risk groups with unacceptably high patterns of utilization,
such as those comprised of persons infected with the HIV virus,
must be identified and eliminated from coverage pursuant to
sound underwriting policies. 2 Otherwise, they argue, insurance
would become financially unsound, and persons with average
patterns of utilization would unfairly be subsidizing those with
higher ones. Thus, the system virtually forces those who
provide financing for health care to take measures to ensure
that their own pools do not attract undue numbers of those at
high risk for incurring large health care expenses.
Insurers, driven to maximize profits by market forces,
sometimes make decisions that are in their own best interests,
but not in society's best interests. These insurers have never
admitted that the present financial instability of their groups is
in large measure their own fault due to the narrow manner in
which they have constructed their risk pools, but it is
increasingly clear that the effects of the narrowing of risk pools
must be overcome.
A reformation of the present system may be accomplished
directly through the reestablishment of very large pools, open to
all who apply, and capable of spreading the risk of the higher
utilizers of health care among a much greater population of
lower utilizers. This reform may also be accomplished indirectly
32 See generally Benjamin Schatz, The AIDS Insurance Crisis: Under-
writing or Overreaching?, AIDS: ONE: LEGAL, SoCIAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES
FACING THE INSURANCE INDusTRY 1 (James Vculek ed., 1988) (analyzing the
legal and public policy implications of underwriting on the basis of sexual
orientation).
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through the creation of "interplan transfers" that require payers
with lower-risk populations to contribute to the financial
stability of those with higher-risk populations. Either way, such
reform must create conditions under which risk pools no longer
include only the individuals covered by a single employer or
insurer. Of course, such change cannot occur as long as the
system is based on the same set of principles that guided its
development. Instead, we must adopt a new set of principles
which will provide the basis for a system capable of meeting the
health care needs of all members of society.
V. EXTRAPOLATING A NEW SET OF PRINCIPLES
FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF EMPIRE BLUE CROSS
AND BLUE SHIELD
As discussed, Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield's practices
differ significantly from those of most private insurers in
America; in fact, Empire's practices are inconsistent with the
values and assumptions that underlie the present, ailing health
insurance system. Instead, these practices suggest a new set of
principles upon which a restructured system should be based.
While these principles remain somewhat untested, their
alternatives have been tested and found wanting, as we are
reminded by the very existence of the health insurance crisis.
Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield offers coverage to all
who are able to pay the premiums for it, regardless of health
status, and spreads risk by placing small employer groups and
individuals who purchase their own coverage in large
community pools. Medium and large employer groups are
either fully experience-rated or are what Empire terms
"incentive-rated" - their premiums are based on a combination
of an individual group's experience and that of the entire pool of
incentive-rated groups. Both incentive-rated and experience-
rated groups are assessed an additional premium charge, which
is used to subsidize the premiums of the community pools.
Through this and other policies of cross-subsidization, Empire,
although forced to compete with numerous commercial insurers,
is, in effect, able to create a kind of single large risk pool made
up of all of its customers.
Empire's policies and experience in providing health
insurance for persons with AIDS are important as illustrations
of a system of wide risk-sharing. To suggest that they offer a
model of an ideal health financing system would over-simplify
both the problems of the current system and the means at our
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disposal to solve them. The creation, for example, of a new
group of not-for-profit insurers like Empire is not a viable
answer to our health insurance problems because such insurers
would be unable to compete with private insurers. Because the
current system requires those who provide financing for health
care to ensure that their own pools do not attract undue
numbers of those at high risk for large health care
expenditures, any third-party payer that acts according to
different principles will find itself covering a far larger
proportion of the high-risk population than would otherwise be
the case.
In order to survive, such an insurer must have sources of
revenue that allow it to offset the higher-than-average costs its
particular customers will naturally incur.3 In Empire's case,
the offsetting conditions include tax-free status and a state-
imposed inpatient reimbursement system that includes a
"payment differential" for socially-useful insurers. The latter
provides Empire with a competitive advantage, since its
competitors pay higher rates for hospital care than it does. This
advantage allows Empire to retain much of the business of
larger groups and the lower-risk groups and individuals in its
community pools. Without this advantage, Empire's policy of
cross-subsidizing small groups and individuals would long ago
have withered away, no matter how much social goodwill
existed at Empire itself. The time when individual not-for-
profit, socially-oriented insurers could play a unique role as
"insurers of last resort" is almost certainly at an end. 4
The preceding analysis gives rise to several principles that
must be embodied in any health care reform plan. This section
presents those elements that deal with issues of risk sharing
For a fuller account of Empire's offsetting financial advantages and its
recent vicissitudes, see generally Looking Backward, supra note 18.
8' There are a few regions, however, in which such insurance providers
continue to demonstrate considerable vitality. In Rochester, New York, for
example, the local Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plan dominates the market and
continues to offer community rating and open enrollment to all applicants; the
major local employers have remained community rated and there is consider-
able cooperation among insurers, employers, and providers. U.S. GEN. ACCT.
OFF., ROCHESTERS COMMUNITY APPROACH YIELDs BETIER AccEss, LOWER
COsTS (1993) (applauding Rochester's unique approach to health care); see also
Robert Leitman et al., Rochester, New York: A Model for Health Reform, 2 J.
AM. HEALTH POLY 49; Theresa Defino, Rochester Health System: A National
Model, MANAGED HEALTHCARE NEWS, Jan. 1993, at 13-15.
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and equity in financing and without which any reform effort is
doomed to failure.
A. UNVERSALrY
Any system of health financing must be universal if the
costs and benefits of the system are to be spread as widely as
possible and if proper control of the system is to be possible.
Omitting large numbers of people from the system will
undermine both equity in the distribution of medical services
and the ability to control costs.
B. BROAD RISK SHARING
The system must be based on the broadest possible risk
sharing arrangements. This does not necessarily require that
all residents of the United States be in a single pool, or even
that the residents of every state form their own pools, as long as
the pools are broad enough to ensure that the costs of medical
care are spread widely and equitably. Only in this way can care
be provided in a manner fair to both those with the greatest
needs - including the chronically ill and those with
"catastrophic" medical costs in any given year - and those who
are at substantially lower risk.
Many foreign countries finance health care using private
insurance that treats all insurers as if they were part of a single
risk pool. 5 Great Britain, for example, created a system in
which the entire population forms a single risk pool and the
government plays a substantial role in the actual delivery of
care."6 Canada has created single risk pools for each of its
provinces, but retains private delivery of care."7 And many of
" See generally Glaser, supra note 27. One important example of a
nation that has used interplan transfers is the Netherlands. See Joyce
Frieden, Is Dutch Health Care a Model for the U.S. Health Care System?, 10
Bus. & HEALTH 34 (1992); Bradford L. Kirkman-Liff, Health Insurance Values
and Implementation in the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany:
An Alternative Path to Universal Coverage, 265 JAMA 2496 (1991). In
Germany, a new risk adjustment system is being implemented during 1993.
See Jeremy W. Hurst, Reform of Health Care in Germany, HEALTH CARE
FINANCING REv., Spring 1991, at 73.
11 See J. ROGERS HOLLINGSWORTH, A PoLITICAL ECONOMY OF MEDICINE:
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 52-64 (1986).
37 See MALcOLM G. TAYLOR, INSURING NATIONAL HEALTH CARE: THE
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the nations of continental Europe (including France, Germany,
and the Netherlands) have implemented systems that achieve
universal coverage with largely private delivery of care through
the use of wide networks of mutual (not-for-profit) health carefunds.38
All of these systems have made important achievements
and are basically popular with the populations they cover.39
Although all of them have cost containment, service delivery,
and quality problems that their sponsors are attempting to
remedy,4 ° they offer valuable lessons for American reformers.
CANADIAN EXPERIENCE 169 (1990); see also JANE FULTON, CANADA's HEALTH
CARE SYSTEM: BORDERING ON THE POsSIBLE 35 (1993); LOOKING NORTH FOR
HEALTH: WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM CANADA'S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (Arnold
Bennett & Orvill Adams eds., 1993); MEDICARE AT MATURITY: ACHIEvEMENTS,
LESSONS & CHALLENGES 32 (Robert G. Evans & Greg L. Stoddart eds., 1986).
38 See ROBERT G. EVANS, WHAT SEEMS TO BE THE PROBLEM? THE
INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT TO RESTRUCTURE HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS (1992)
(summarizing problems within and efforts to reform health financing systems
in other nations). On specific reform efforts, see BRIAN ABEL-SMITH, COST
CONTAINMENT AND NEW PRIORITIES IN HEALTH CARE: A STUDY OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITy (1992); ORGANZATION FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND
DEV., THE REFORM OF HEALTH CARE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SEVEN
OECD COUNTRIES (1992); Patricia Day & Rudolph Klein, Britain's Health
Care Experiment, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1991, at 39-59; Jeremy W. Hurst,
Reforming Health Care in Seven European Nations, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1991,
at 7-21; Thomas A. Madden, The Reform of the British National Health Serv-
ice, J. PUB. HEALTH POL Y Autumn 1991, at 378-96; Richard B. Satman,
Competition and Reform in the Swedish Health System, 68 MILBANK Q. 597
(1990); W. Van de Van, Peristroijka in the Dutch Health Care System: a
Demonstration Project for Other Countries, 35 EUROPEAN ECON. REV. 430
(1991); sources cited supra note 35 regarding the Netherlands and Germany.
39 With respect to popular satisfaction with national health financing and
provision systems, see Robert J. Blendon et al., Satisfaction with Health
Systems in Ten Nations, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1990, at 185; Robert J.
Blendon & Humphrey Taylor, Views on Health Care: Public Opinion in Three
Nations, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1989, at 149.
40 See Jonathan E. Fielding & Pierre-Jean Lancry, Lessons from
France - 'Vive la Difference': The French Health Care System and U.S.
Health Care System Reform, 270 JAMA 748, 749-51 (1993); Frieden, supra
note 35 (describing the health care system of the Netherlands); Kirkman-Liff,
supra note 35 (same); John K Iglehart, Health Policy Report: Germany's
Health Care System (pts. 1 & 2), 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 503, 1750 (1991).
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C. RISK ADJUSTMENT
If there are multiple pools (as there inevitably will be in
any system - public, private, or a mixture of the two - that
spreads risk on a basis less broad than the entire American
population), then there must be some method of "risk
adjustment" to ensure that the pools are relatively equal in risk
status and fiscal soundness.
Due to differences in the risk status of populations by
geographical area, social class, gender, race and ethnicity,
employment status, and other demographic characteristics,
multiple pools will tend to attract a different mix of high- and
low-risk persons. Risk adjustment systems (either "front-end"
systems that provide revenues to pools adjusted for the risk
status of their members or "back-end" systems that shift funds
from one pool to another at the end of a benefit period when
actual medical utilization is known and can be evaluated)
prevent pools from growing apart in ways that allow premiums
charged or benefits given to vary excessively among pools. This
consistency is especially necessary for any type of systemic
reform based on competition among health plans, under which
plans will certainly be tempted to reduce costs (and thereby
lower prices) by avoiding enrollment of high-risk persons.
D. OPEN ENROLLMENT
All pools must be open to enrollment by all persons in the
geographical areas covered by them without medical
underwriting or other attempts to discriminate among risk
groups; only in this manner can we even begin to ensure that
pools attract a more or less random selection of health risks.
E. EQUITABLE FiNANCING
Any reformed system must be financed in a fair and
equitable manner that puts no undue burdens on those with
greater need for medical services. Ideally, an equitable
financing system would be based on the principle of community
rating (equal premiums or other types of payments for
equivalent or substantially similar benefit packages), adjusted
by income to ensure that the wealthy pay more than the less
affluent. People with less than a defined income level should
either (1) not have to contribute at all (in a tax-based system),
or (2) should have their coverage subsidized by public funds (in
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a premium-based system). This approach to cost spreading is
simply a version of the general principle upon which progressive
tax systems are based in modern industrialized nations: those
who have more should pay more for services that all receive. It
also avoids one of the perceived problems of pure community
rating: that often in such a system the low-risk but poor will be
unfairly subsidizing the high-risk but well-off.41
F. UNIFORM BENEFITS
All residents of this country should have access to the same,
standard benefit package. Standardized coverage is not only a
question of equity in the provision of care, but would prevent
health plans in a multi-pool environment from (1) reducing
benefits for everyone, (2) reducing benefits for selected
populations in order to ensure that they attract only better
risks, or (3) reducing their costs directly by reducing utilization.
Such a standardized benefit package must include not only the
typical acute care coverage that employer-sponsored plans cur-
rently include, but also preventive care services and those long-
term care services that the chronically ill require.
G. ELIMINATION OF EMPLOYER POWER
The power that employers have to determine whether to
provide benefits at all, the nature of the benefits to be provided,
the size and type of risk pools, and the financing arrangements
underlying those pools must be eliminated. Since it is the
unique power of employer-established risk pools in our current
financing system that has caused our present predicament in
the arena of health care financing, the elimination of employer
power is the essential principle around which all of the others
must be structured.
41 Cf William R. Jones et al., Pure Community Rating: A Quick Fix to
Avoid, 3 J. AM. HEALTH POLiY 29, 31 (1993) (arguing that younger, healthier,
and less well paid employees would subsidize older, less healthy, better paid
employees in a pure community rating system).
4
' See generally Judith K. Barr & Robert A. Padgug, Employers and
AIDS: Meeting the Health Benefit Needs of People with H1V/AIDS, 3
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POLY 83 (discussing employer responses to HIV/AIDS
care); Sara D. Watson, Reality Ignored: Health Reform and People with
Disabilities, 3 J. AM. HEALTH POL'Y 49 (1993) (discussing the needs of the
chronically ill and the services required by them).
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VI. IMPLEMENTING NEW HEALTH REFORM
PRINCIPLES IN AMERICA
It does not follow from our analysis that only one type of
health care finance system can embody the principles outlined
above. Still, individual employers and insurers in a reformed
American system will perforce lose much of their direct power
over the health care financing system. Above all, employers will
lose their centrality to the system - and their continued ability
to further narrow risk pools - except to provide necessary
sources of funds. They will become, as in the case of Empire's
customer base, merely pieces of a more complicated,
interconnected set of larger risk pools that should be capable of
handling even the most expensive patterns of illness.
There are a number of approaches to health care financing
reform which make implementation of these principles possible.
Until now, however, no satisfactory health care reform proposal
has been proposed. In the United States, reform proposals tend
to fall into one of three categories: (1) market-based universal
coverage plans; (2) universal, single payer plans; and (3) plans
to incrementally reform the present system. Brief analyses of
these general approaches will show that while all have
progressive elements, each of the current proposals fall short of
meeting at least some of the criteria.
A. MANAGED COMPETrION
Currently, there is rapid movement toward using of market
reform to solve the current health care finance crisis.' These
market reform plans are primarily built on the concept of
"managed competition," a term coined by Stanford professor
Alain Enthoven. The essence (and advantage) of managed
competition, according to Enthoven, is that it promotes "cost-
conscious consumer choice among health plans in the pursuit of
equity and efficiency in health care financing and delivery."'
Under Enthoven's proposed system of managed competition,
employees would be able to choose among competing health
' Colloquy, Managed Competition: Health Reform American Style,
HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993.
4ALAiN C. ENTHOVEN, MANAGED COMPETITION OF ALTERNATIVE
DELIVERY SYSTEMS, IN COMPETITION IN THE HEALTH CARE CENTER: TEN YEARS
LATER 83, 85 (1988).
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plans offered by their employer. These health plans would be
comprised of provider networks integrating doctors, hospitals,
and insurance providers. Proponents of such a managed
competition scheme claim that improved quality and reduced
costs follow as the necessary by-product of network competition
for patient enrollment.
In addition to competing on the basis of quality care and
price, such a managed competition scheme attempts to promote
cost-consciousness through tax disincentives. Under the plan,
the maximum amount of employer-paid premiums that an
individual would be allowed to exclude from their taxable
income would be equivalent to the price of the lowest-cost plan
then available to that individual.45 Thus, individuals who opted
to join more expensive health plans would bear the additional
cost.
46
Under Enthoven's proposal, "the federal government would
enact legislation giving each state powerful incentives to create
a 'public sponsor' agency to act as a sponsor for people otherwise
unsponsored. '4  Thus individuals or families not covered
through employment would have the option to register with a
public sponsor, provided that they agree to abide by the
conditions of participation. Once such groups are formed, the
public sponsors aggregate the buying power of those small
employers and individuals in order to contract on their behalf
for a wide variety of managed care plans.
Unfortunately, the health care reform principles reveal that
Enthoven's system of managed competition fails to measure up.
While such a plan may satisfy the principles of universality and
open enrollment, Enthoven's version of managed competition
leaves employers (in particular, large employers) in control of
the system.
Like Enthoven's plan, President Clinton's new health care
proposal (released in draft form in September, 1993),' similarly
4 This maximum deduction will not always be equivalent to the cost of
the lowest-priced plan; rather, it will vary based upon the framework of the
specific managed competition plan. For instance, the maximum deduction
might be set at an average cost of all then available plans.
46 Elaine Lu, The Potential Effect of Managed Competition in Health Care
on Provider Liability and Patient Autonomy, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 519 (1993).
47 Alain C. Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer Choice Health Plan
for the 1990s: Universal Health Insurance in a System Designed to Promote
Quality and Economy (pt. 1), 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 29, 31 (1989).
48 WHTE HousE DoMEsTc POL'Y COUNcIL, THE PRESIDENT'S HEALTH
19931
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rests upon managed competition. Unlike Enthoven's plan, the
Clinton proposal substantially decreases employer power over
benefit structures and financing methodologies. Therefore, at
first glance, the proposal seems to take active steps to reduce
the risk pooling problems created by the current employer-
sponsored system. For instance, the Clinton Proposal would
create very large "community" pools that would include all
employer groups with fewer than 5,000 members, as well as all
individual purchasers, Medicaid recipients, and government
employees. Further, the plan creates front-end risk adjustment
mechanisms to balance projected utilization experience.
Nevertheless, the Clinton Proposal falls short of satisfying
other health reform principles that are an essential part of any
truly effective and equitable health reform. The Clinton
Proposal allows large employers (those with more than 5,000
employees) to decide whether to enter the risk sharing pools or
to remain autonomous. The practical effect of permitting such
a choice will be to ensure that employers whose employees have
greater-than-average health care needs will join the newly
created pools, while employers whose employees pose lower-
than-average health risks will not join. Such a system removes
large numbers of the "best risks" from the community pools, and
therefore clearly violates the principles of broad risk sharing
and employer power.
We do not mean to imply that no plan under the rubric of
managed competition can measure up to all of the necessary
principles for health reform. However, no such plan has yet
been proposed, nor does one appear likely to be proposed given
the current political environment in the United States.
B. SINGLE PAYER PLANS
Universal, single payer plans make up the second common
category of health reform proposals. Best exemplified by the
proposed American Health Security Act of 1993,49 introduced by
Senator Paul D. Wellstone (D-Minn.), single payer plans most
completely embody the seven reform principles enunciated
above. 0 Under the "Wellstone Bill," as it is called, the federal
SECURITY PLAN: THE CLINTON BLUEPRINT (1993).
S. 491, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
5oFor an example of another proposed single payer plan, see David U.
Himmelstein et al., A National Health Program for the United States: A
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government, as the single payer of health insurance benefits,
would be responsible for collecting and distributing to the states
all funds necessary for the nation's health care coverage."'
Equitable, progressive financing would be achieved through
increases in marginal federal income tax rates, payroll taxes on
employers, and the elimination of certain tax loopholes.52
The Wellstone bill provides for uniform, comprehensive
benefits, while disallowing duplicative coverage outside the
system for included benefits.53 While its main focus would be
primary and preventive care, inpatient services and long-term
care would also be covered. 4 A national "Quality Council"
would assure the quality of these services through a system of
guidelines, incentives, and peer reviews.55
The proposal's most effective feature is its separation of
health care coverage from the employment setting." The
removal of employer control furthers the goals of universality
and open enrollment. With coverage based on state residency
rather than employment status, employers would lose the power
to determine their employees' coverage. The unemployed and
self-employed would no longer be excluded, and medical
underwriting would be eliminated, ensuring that high-risk
individuals would not be denied coverage.
Insurance pools based on state population would be larger
and more random than employment-based pools in which
employers are able to opt out of the system, making broader
risk sharing possible.57 The proposal does not, however, address
ways of dealing with the potential differences in risk status by
geographical area, although the establishment of such large risk
pools might eliminate the need for regional risk adjustment.
Despite its embodiment of our health reform principles,
implementation of the Wellington bill or any single payer plan
seems unlikely. Fear of tax increases, even if unfounded, may
Physician's Proposal, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 102 (1989) (advocating a single
comprehensive insurance program to cover all Americans).
51 See Paul D. Wellstone & Ellen Shaffer, The American Health Security
Act: A Single Payer Proposal, 328 NEW.ENG. J. MED. 1489, 1489 (1993).
52 Id. at 1492.
53 Id. at 1491.
54Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
5 7 Id. at 1492.
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hinder public support, and many medical care providers will
oppose the plan because it could lower their fees.5" Private
health care insurers will also be strong opponents because, by
restricting duplicative outside coverage, the plan limits the
private coverage they can offer.59 Moreover, most recent
proposals appear to favor managed competition over single
payer plans,60 despite the fact that managed competition
proposals less perfectly embody the reform principles outlined
above.
C. INCREMENTAL REFORM PROPOSALS
Finally, a wide variety of health care financing reform
proposals can best be described as "incremental" reform
proposals.6 ' Short of advocating the creation of an entirely new
system, these proposals address less drastic changes that can be
made to the present system. Examples of incremental reform
proposals include the expansion of Medicaid,62 state mandating
of employer-sponsored health insurance," state subsidization of
individuals, businesses, or both,6 and the establishment of risk
pools for medically uninsurable persons.65
While these proposals aim to improve access to health
insurance for individuals and small groups, they ignore the
underlying problems of our present system, and address neither
the rising costs of insurance nor the importance of broader risk
sharing. Finally, many such proposals maintain employer
power over access to health care.
51 Id. at 1490.
59 Id. at 1491.
Id. at 1492.
61 An example of the incremental approach being discussed in Congress
is the "Affordable Health Care Now Act of 1993," put forward by a large
number of Republicans in the House of Representatives. See H.R. 3080, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
65 See John F. Holahan & Sheila Zedlewski, Expanding Medicaid to
Cover Uninsured Americans, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1991, at 45.
' See Michael S. Dukakis, The States and Health Care Reform, 327 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1090, 1090-92 (1992).
' See Thomas Bodenheimer, Private Insurance Reform in the 1990s: Can
It Solve the Health Care Crisis?, 22 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVICES 197, 200 (1992).
65 See id. at 200-01.
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Despite their shortcomings, however, these incremental
reforms may perform an important stopgap function until such
time as a reformed health care system embodying all of our
reform principles can be adopted.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, we as a nation have much work to do before we can
implement an effective and equitable health care financing
reform plan. However we finally accomplish this, it remains
clear that any reformed system must seriously confront and
reverse the deleterious effects of the narrowing of insurance risk
pools. None of the various approaches to health reform will
succeed unless the costs of health care can be spread equitably
among all Americans. Persons with AIDS and others with
chronic illnesses must be relieved of the disproportionate
burdens of higher costs and reduced access to health insurance
and care they are now forced to bear. Successfully reforming
our health care finance system will first require us to discover
for ourselves what has long been made a matter of policy
elsewhere in the world: in the sphere of health care, the only
principle upon which a workable and fair system of health care
financing can be constructed is that of "social solidarity,"
whereby we all help each other (and ourselves) by sharing
equitably in the risks of incurring health care expenses.
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